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Pomor Brotherhood?

November 9, 2012, it was reported that Ivan Moseyev, leader of the so-called Pomor movement, had been accused of high treason in favor of

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November 9, 2012, it was reported that Ivan Moseyev, leader of the so-called Pomor movement, had been accused of high treason in favor of Norway and for incitement of ethnic hatred. (footnote 1)  When the court hearing began November 21 Moseyev’s relations to Norway were, however, not mentioned. Still, for many Russians, perhaps also for Russian authorities, these relations remain suspect. Outside the court building a group of demonstrators had gathered carrying anti-Norwegian as well as anti-Pomor slogans. (2) The Moseyev case may still harm the good Russian-Norwegian relations in the north. I will not go into a debate about the content of the charge against Moseyev, nor the question of guilt. Far too much is uncertain here. One of the questions that can and should be discussed in the aftermath of the Moseyev affair is, however, the “Pomor question” and how this question is perceived in Russia and Norway. 

Norway has a clear interest in a strong and stable Russian north. Therefore I find it highly unlikely that Norwegian authorities deliberately should have tried to destabilize Russia by instigating Pomor separatism. Still, it is clear for everyone that Moseyev has received various forms of support from Norway. How can this be explained? I believe the Norwegian backing of Moseyev should be interpreted not as a support for his ethnopolitical ambitions, but as a misguided but well-intentioned support for Russian-Norwegian “people-to-people” cooperation. In Norway there has, unfortunately, not been a sufficient understanding of the Russian Pomor discourse. Pomor has generally been regarded as an unproblematic and positive term. Very few Norwegians have been aware of how contested and politicized the term Pomor has become in Russia. On the other hand the Norwegian Pomor discourse is hardly known in Russia. This lack of knowledge on both sides of the border leads to misinterpretations and suspicion. Seen from an authoritative Russian position the Norwegian support for Pomor activists is interpreted as an unfriendly intervention. Seen from Norway it seems like Russia has been gripped by nationalist paranoia when it arrests Moseyev. Obviously, some improvement of mutual understanding would not hurt. 

Ivan Moseyev

Ivan Moseyev has for a long time been involved in the (re)invention or, as he would probably put it, revival of the Pomors as an ethnic group. Moseyev has since 1992 been the chairman of the National Cultural Centre “Pomor Renaissance”. (3)  He has been president of the Pomor Association of Arkhangelsk Oblast and grandmaster of the Pomor Brotherhood. Moseyev is also a scholar, a cultural anthropologist, and serves as the director of the Pomor Institute of Indigenous People and Minorities at the Northern Arctic Federal University (NArFU) in Arkhangelsk. (4)

Moseyev is a well-known in Northern Norway. Here he has for years been in close contact with people involved in Norwegian-Russian cooperation. Quite a few of these have even been enrolled as members in the Norwegian branch of Moseyev’s (now notorious) Pomor Brotherhood. One of the most notable of Moseyev’s Norwegian friends is Thor Robertsen, former special adviser in the Finnmark County Administration and for years an important public figure in the region. Robertsen is the leader of the Norwegian branch of the Pomor Brotherhood and has, together with Moseyev, edited a collection of so-called Pomor fairytales (see below).   

While Moseyev has been celebrated in Norway, he has been a marginal figure at home. Here his ethnic movement has been regarded with suspicion. In Russia the very idea of the Pomors as an ethnic group is, as we will see, highly contested.   

Pomors

Ethnic and regional terms can be subjects of intense debate. People at different places at different times may define themselves in different ways. In Norway there have for instance recently been debates about the content and correctness of the ethnic terms kven and sigøyner (Gypsy/Rom). Even the content of the term Norwegian has been questioned, as the number of immigrants has increased. Pomor is also a concept that has been invested with various meanings among different groups over time. 

On the Norwegian side of the border the term Pomor is not very contested. Here the term is very much related to the so-called Pomor trade, a period of barter trade between Northwest Russia and Northern Norway which lasted from 1740 to 1917. The Pomor trade got its name from the Pomors, the Norwegians’ name for the White Sea Russians they traded with. The Pomor trade has, over the years, been celebrated as an example of how Russian-Norwegian relations should be; good and of mutual benefit. During the establishment of the Barents Region the Pomor trade was referred to as a historical model for the new cooperation. During the last twenty years the word Pomor has been applied rhetorically in Norway in order to express goodwill towards Russia. A Norwegian proposal for a special economic zone on the Russian-Norwegian border was named The Pomor Zone. Special Pomor visas have been introduced for Russian citizens in Northwest Russia who want to visit Norway. The town of Vardø proudly calls itself the Pomor capital and hosts the annual Pomor Festival where the town’s old relations eastwards are celebrated. Pomor has, in short, been an unproblematic, positively laden term in Norway. The evocation of Pomorness on the Norwegian side has been a way of saying “Norway and Russia are friends”, or “we have something in common”. When Thorvald Stoltenberg proclaimed “I am a Pomor” in a speech in Arkhangelsk last year (see below) this was probably what he meant. Unfortunately, however, such statements can today be interpreted quite differently on the other side of the border. In Russia Pomorness has become a complicated issue.  

Many people around the White Sea refer to themselves as Pomors or claim to be of Pomor origin. Arkhangelsk is, like Vardø, sometimes called the Pomor capital. For most people Pomor is a purely regional term. There are, however, nowadays also a small group of people who define themselves as ethnically Pomor. During the 2002 census 6571 individuals (the great majority of them in the Arkhangelsk Oblast) chose to identify their ethnicity not as Russian but as Pomor. (5)  Moseyev belongs to this group of radical Pomors. In the article “No Status-No People?” he demands recognition for the Pomors as an ethnic minority and an indigenous people. (6)  He also wants to revitalize Pomor culture, including so-called Pomorskaya Govoria, or Pomor language. In the first indictment Moseyev was also accused of conspiring to set up a “Republic of Pomors”. I have not found any statements that confirm this accusation, although the claim of indigenousness could be regarded as an indirect way of claiming political rights. There might be some Pomors who dream about political self-government, perhaps even independence from Russia, but they represent a small minority, even among the most radical activists. 

The radical Pomor movement seems to have been growing over the last years. At the same time it has been heavily criticized, also by people who regard themselves as Pomors. In newspapers and on various internet sites the debate has been heated. Moseyev and his associates have been accused of being national traitors. What has made the Pomor debate particularly intense might be that Pomor ethnicity challenges the very unity of the Russian nation. If the Pomors can declare themselves as a separate ethnic group so can other regional subgroups across the country. There are fears that such a fragmentation could lead to the breakup of the Russian nation and state. (7)

We see that there are different discourses about Pomorness on the two sides of the Russian-Norwegian border. Whereas Pomor is an uncontested and unproblematic term on the Norwegian side it is contested and politicized on the Russian side. On both sides of the border there seems to be little knowledge about the Other’s discourse. This creates, I believe, a climate for misunderstandings and misinterpretations that can harm the good bilateral relations that exist between Norway and Russia. The Moseyev case illustrates this. 

Three small happenings may shed some light on how the Norwegian and Russian Pomor discourses collide, and how good Norwegian intentions can be (mis)interpreted on the other side of the border. The first is the establishment of the Norwegian branch of the Pomor Brotherhood in 2009, the second is the publishing of Pomor fairytales in 2010, and the third is Thorvald Stoltenberg’s speech and letter to the Pomors in 2011. Ivan Moseyev has been involved in all these happenings. 

The Pomor Brotherhood

In the first indictment against Moseyev we read the following: “With support from foreign special services Moseyev established the organization “Brotherhood of Pomors”, which connects Pomors in the Barents region”. (8) In Russia the brotherhood seems to consist of Pomor ethnic activists. There is, however, also a Norwegian branch of the brotherhood with a slightly different character. It was founded three years ago during the Pomor Festival in Vardø. In a festive ceremony several prominent Northern Norwegians, including Rune Rafaelsen, General Secretary of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, were enrolled in the brotherhood. Thor Robertsen was declared as leader (rormann) of the Norwegian branch of the brotherhood. Ivan Moseyev himself performed the role of grand master in the initiation rite and presented Robertsen with a symbolic gift, a traditional Pomor seal-hunting harpoon.  (9)

The Norwegians who joined the Pomor Brotherhood had all been involved in Russian-Norwegian cooperation for a long time and should be considered friends of Russia. Rafaelsen and Robertsen have even received Russian medals for their contributions. Why did these people then choose to associate themselves with the radical Pomor movement? My guess is that the ceremony was interpreted solely as yet another manifestation of good Russian-Norwegian relations. By letting themselves be enrolled in the brotherhood they were saying “we support Russian-Norwegian cooperation”, not “we support the ethnic movement of the Pomors”. It cannot have been their intention to join a radical, perhaps even separatist, movement. The fact that the style of the ceremony was somewhat “carnivalesque”, with funny hats and other paraphernalia, might have given the participants the impression that they were taking part in something amusing and harmless. In retrospective we may ask if they were manipulated by Moseyev and his movement. It is of course hard to tell what Moseyev’s intentions were at the time, but his ideas of Pomorness must surely have diverged from those of his Norwegian “brethren”.  

Pomor Fairytales

In 2010 Moseyev and Robertsen appeared together again, this time as editors of a book called Pomor fairytales. (10)  The book contained eleven fairytales from both sides of the Russian-Norwegian border. The fairytales were presented in three languages; Russian, Norwegian and Govoria, “Pomor language”. In Russia the book was supported by Moseyev’s National Cultural Center “Pomor Renaissance”. On the Norwegian side of the border it received support from the Norwegian Barents Secretariat. The Secretariat actually bought a large part of the copies in order to give them away as presents to schools and libraries in Russia. 

The Secretariat probably regarded the publication as a cultural cooperation project that would bring joy to people on both sides of the border. It would surprise me if the political implications of it were discussed at all. It was after all only a fairytale book, nothing dangerous, or so it would seem. In Russia the book caused, however, controversy. On October 6 2011 Dmitry Semushin published an article on Regnum.ru under the title “How and why did Norwegians write “Pomor fairytales” for Russians”. He claimed that this was done with the purpose of supporting the Pomor movement and, in turn, destabilize the Russian north. (11) For most Norwegians this might seem like a paranoid conclusion. If we read the foreword of the book carefully we can, however, better understand the critical tone of Semushin and others. Here it is for example stated that “Norwegians are Pomors too, only with another language”. What does this imply? Are Pomors really Norwegians, not Russians, ethnically speaking? It is also written that “the book has been translated into Govoria, the oral language of the indigenous population of the Russian part of the Pomor region”. This is also a radical statement in the ongoing Pomor debate. First there is the claim that Govoria is a separate language (i.e. not Russian), secondly that it is the language of the indigenous population. The fact that the fairytales were intended for schoolchildren made the book even more suspicious for people critical towards the Pomor movement. Were the Norwegians secretly trying to “Pomoricize” the minds of the young? Semushin and other people’s accusations against the authors and promoters of the book echoes today’s official indictment against Moseyev.  

“I am a Pomor”

The Pomor fairytales were presented during the Pomor Festival in Vardø in 2010 with the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, the “father of the Barents Region” and the father of the current Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, as the honorary guest. During the festival Stoltenberg too was enrolled in the Pomor Brotherhood through an initiation rite similar to that the year before. In a report from the event, published by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, there is a picture of Stoltenberg posing in a “Pomor” costume. (12)

Some months later Stoltenberg was invited to Arkhangelsk where he was appointed honorary doctor at Moseyev’s university NArFU. In his inaugural address Stoltenberg proclaimed, in Russian, that “Ya – Pomor”, “I am a Pomor”. (13) During his visit to Arkhangelsk Stoltenberg also signed a so-called “Pomor Agreement” together with Elena Koudryashova, Rector of NArFU, and the leaders of the Russian and Norwegian Pomor Brotherhoods, Moseyev and Robertsen. The main goal of this agreement was allegedly to assist the development of the Pomor culture in Russia and in Norway. This included support for the establishment of Moseyev’s “Pomor Institute of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities in the North” within NArFU. In September 2011 Stoltenberg sent a letter of greetings to the participants of the 4th Pomor Forum in Arkhangelsk. Here he wrote that ” Being an Honorary Doctor of NArFU and an Honorary Pomor I am personally committed to provide further support to the international Pomor projects focused on the development of cross-cultural, scientific, and educational cooperation in the Barents region.” (14)

I cannot see why Stoltenberg should want to provoke anyone. His “I am a Pomor” was probably intended to appeal to the locals as Kennedy did to the Berliners by claiming, in German, that «Ich bin ein Berliner». What Stoltenberg did was to make use of the term Pomor in the “Norwegian way”, as a bridge-building mantra. As a Norwegian he associated the term first and foremost with the Pomor trade, which he described as a “genuine example of people-to people relations across the border”. He also claimed that “his idea to establish the Barents cooperation in 1992 was a result of his wish to re-establish those relations”. (15) Still, for more “patriotically-leaning” Russians his words could easily be interpreted as provocative. The signing of the Pomor Agreement was perhaps even more controversial. It could leave the impression that Norway had started to negotiate directly with the Pomors instead of with Russia. The fact that Stoltenberg visited Arkhangelsk together with a delegation from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the fact that his son is the current Prime Minister of Norway made it hard not to see him as an official representative of the kingdom. 

What to learn?

Stoltenberg’s speech and letter, the Barents Secretariat’s support for the fairytales, and the establishment of the Norwegian Pomor Brotherhood were all well-intentioned acts, meant to appeal to all Russians. They should, I believe, be read as polite gestures, as invitations. I cannot imagine that Stoltenberg, Rafaelsen or Robertsen have any intention of splitting the Russian nation or undermining the Russian Federation. These people have all contributed to better relations between Norway and Russia over a long time. At worst they could be criticized for acting naively, lacking understanding for how contested the Pomor issue has become in Russia, and for getting mixed up in alliances with radical figures who might have another agenda than themselves. 

The use of terms and choice of partners are delicate issues in cross-border cooperation. Particularly representatives of official Norway should be careful about siding with one or the other part in debates concerning ethnicity and national belonging across the border. On the other hand Russian authorities should be more careful about interpreting all Norwegian support for “Pomors” as hostile interventions. Learning about each other’s ways of thinking is a good way to improve a relationship. More knowledge is the best recipe against naïvety, suspicion, and unnecessary misunderstandings.   

Footnotes:
(1) T. Pettersen, “Charged with high treason for cooperating with Norway”, BarentsObserver.com, 9 November 2012: http://www.barentsobserver.com/en/society/charged-high-treason-cooperating-norway-09-11
 
(2)  T. Pettersen, ”No charge for high treason”, BarentsObserver.com, 21 November 2012:  http://www.barentsobserver.com/en/society/2012/11/no-charge-high-treason-21-11
 
(3)  The National Cultural Center “Pomor Renaissance” (Национально-культурный центр “Поморское возрождение”): http://pomorcpp.org/org/?org=6&show­about
 
(4)  The homepage of the Northern (Arctic) Federal University (NArFU) contains a short biography of Moseyev, describing some of his public involvements:  http://narfu.ru/media/category_quot_expert_quot_n/expert.php?personid=27553 
 
(5)  Vserossiyskaya perepis naselenia 2002 goda [Russian Population Census 2002]: http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=86 
 
(6)  I. Moseyev, “No Status- No People?”, Pomorcpp.org, 25 October 2008: http://www.pomorcpp.org/insight/print.html?id=1169 
 
(7)  For a thorough discussion of the Pomor issue in Russia today, see A. Pyzhova, Identity and Regional Culture: The Case of the Pomor People in Arkhangel’sk Region, Russia (Tromsø 2011): http://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/3688/thesis.pdf?sequence=2 
 
(8)  T. Pettersen, “Charged with high treason for cooperating with Norway”,
 
 (9) J. Karlsbakk, “Pomorbroderskapet etablert i Vardø” [Pomor Brotherhood established in Vardø], Barents.no, 6 August, 2009: http://www.barents.no/pomorbroderskapet-etablert-i-vardoe.4616810-41594.html 
 
(10)  I. Moseyev & T. Robertsen (eds.), Поморськие сказки / Поморськи скаски /Pomoreventyr [Pomor Fairytales] (Arkhangelsk, 2010). Available online at: http://cs5148.userapi.com/u225793/docs/0eef28b4c599/Pomorski_skaski.pdf 
 
(11)  D. Semushin, ”Как и зачем норвежцы написали для русских “поморские сказки”” [How and why did Norwegians write “Pomor fairytales” for Russians], Regnum.ru, 6 October 2011:  http://www.regnum.ru/news/1452906.html%20%20%20%20 See also, D. Semushin, ”Зачем “норвежско-поморское возрождение” русским детям?” [Why “Norwegian-Pomor renaissance” for Russian children?], Regnum.ru, 30 October 2011:  http://www.regnum.ru/news/1461482.html 
 
(12)  K. Kipurova, ”Memory of the Pomor Trade celebrated in Vardø”, Barents.no, 10 August 2010: http://www.barents.no/memory-of-the-pomor-trade-celebrated-in-vardoe.4805574-41098.html 
 
(13)  T. Pettersen, “Thorvald Stoltenberg: “Ja ­ Pomor””, BarentsObserver.com, 16 February 2011:  http://www.barentsobserver.com/en/sections/russia/thorvald-stoltenberg-ja-pomor   
 
(14)  “Letter of greetings from Thorvald Stoltenberg to participants of the Pomor Forum”, Narfu.ru, 15 September 2011:  http://narfu.ru/en/news/?ELEMENT_ID=20631 
 
(15)   T. Pettersen, “Thorvald Stoltenberg: “Ja ­ Pomor””, BarentsObserver.com, 16 February 2011:  http://www.barentsobserver.com/en/sections/russia/thorvald-stoltenberg-ja-pomor