Vyacheslav Zilanov is a veteran in Russian fisheries management, and the question above is the title of a book he launched in Murmansk before Christmas. Those who read the book will find out that it is more conclusive than questioning. Zilanov was a Deputy Minister of Fisheries in the Soviet Union and among other things participated in the so-called Grey Zone negotiations in the 1970s. He has held a number of positions in Russian fisheries management. He is now retired and is critical of the current fisheries policy in Russia.
Poor agreements
The Arctic is primarily a large body of water that is surrounded by five countries: Russia, USA, Canada, Greenland/Denmark and Norway. Four of these are NATO members. Consequently, Zilanov believes that Russia must be on guard. He also claims that Russia has achieved particularly poor maritime delimitation agreements with its neighbours to both the east (USA) and west (Norway). The Russian negotiators have, according to Zilanov, simply given their neighbours areas of sea that are too large, both the Bering Sea and the Barents Sea. Russian fishermen are the biggest losers because they are either prohibited from important fishing grounds or at risk of becoming so. The worst of all is the agreement with USA concerning the Bering Sea. The Russian negotiators traded good fishing grounds for areas with nearly no fish at all. This is due among other things to the fact that the fishing industry has been shut out of the Russian negotiating delegations, while their counterparts have had professional fisheries expertise.
Recognised fishery protection zone?
Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia negotiated for 40 years to arrive at a final agreement concerning the division of the Barents Sea. Norway supported the centreline principle, while the Soviet Union/Russia chose to follow the line drawn by Josef Stalin in 1926 based on the sector principle. The disputed area was of 175,000 km², which corresponds to almost half the area of the Norwegian mainland. It was this area that Norway and Russia divided between the two countries when the new treaty on maritime delimitation entered into force in the summer of 2011. In addition, Russia disputed that Norway had the right to establish a fishery protection zone around Svalbard when this came into force in 1977. The Russians still oppose the Norwegian jurisdiction over the fishing protection zone, among other reasons because Russian authorities believe that the zone is not in accordance with the Svalbard Treaty. According to the Russian view, the Norwegian coastguard does not have the right to control Russian vessels fishing off the coast of Svalbard, and Zilanov believes that Norwegian inspections lead to unnecessary confrontations in the fishery protection zone. Russia may now have lost this battle, among other reasons because the new delimitation line runs east of the sector line that Russians wanted as the boundary. Among other things, Zilanov writes:
“If we are to look a little into the future, we must admit that the [delimitation] treaty of 2010 gives every reason to assume that Russia has already recognized the 200 [nautical] mile fishery protection zone around Svalbard.”
On top of the fact that Russian fishermen stand to “lose” the fishery protection zone, Zilanov fears that the Russian fishing fleet can have major problems if there is as much ice in the Barents Sea as previously, such as for instance in 1979. At that time, virtually the entire area that is now the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone was frozen.
Fish rather than oil
The growing oil and gas activities in the north do not receive the full acceptance of the Russian fisheries veteran, and he believes the fishing industry must be prioritized above the oil industry, for both environmental and economic reasons. The petroleum activity may only be a temporary economic factor, while the fish is a renewable resource that lasts “for all eternity”. Moreover, Russia could lose out on several fronts. Norway is better equipped both technologically and economically to extract oil and gas in the north. On top of it all, an oil disaster in the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone could have major consequences for the joint Norwegian-Russian fish stocks. In addition, Zilanov refers to the fact that the ocean currents in the north will transport any oil spill into the Russian zone.
“Today we sell healthy fish, which comes from a pure and cold Barents Sea. If we lose this brand, tens of thousands of workers in Russia and Norway as well as the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland will lose their jobs.”
He also fears that a possible opening for the oil exploration activities on Svalbard can lead to a race in which several of the major countries that have ratified the Svalbard Treaty sign up, including USA, China, Japan and United Kingdom etc.
Representative?
How many share Zilanov’s view? It is difficult to say, but he refers to the fact that just 60 percent of the representatives in the State Duma voted in favour of ratifying the treaty on maritime delimitation in the Barents Sea. All who voted in favour came from the president’s party, United Russia. The representatives from the other parties either abstained or voted against.
You do not need to agree with Zilanov to benefit from his book, and “someone” should feel a responsibility to translate it to Norwegian. It provides a good insight into the reasoning of the opposition to the current fisheries policy in Russia. In addition, it is full of stories and anecdotes from various meetings between Norwegian and Soviet/Russian politicians and diplomats, including meetings that have been among the most important in the relationship between the two neighbouring countries.
